Ϯϴ

© 2017 Published by Politeia (politeia.fpn.unibl.org). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/rs) 

32/,7(,$

ā

ā9RO

ā1R

ɉɈɅɂɌȿɂȺāāȽɨɞ

āȻɪ

6UÿD7ULINRYLü

2ULJLQDO6FLHQWLILF3DSHU

 

75803¶6)25(,*132/,&<

A victory for the Deep State


Key words 

Trump, deep state, global 
hegemony, realism, 
exceptionalism, duopoly, media 
 

Author 

Dr. Srdja Trifkovic teaches 
international relations at the 
Faculty of Political Sciences of 
the University of Banja Luka. 
 

Correspondence 

[email protected] 

 
Field 

International relations 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
DOI 

10.5937/pol1713028T 
 

UDC 

327(73)"2017/..." 
 

Paper received on 

19.05.2017. 
 

Paper accepted for publishing 
on 

28.06.2017.  

Summary 

 

     Donald Trump, an outsider who won the Presidency against 
all odds and predictions, came to the White House apparently 
determined to chart a new strategic course in foreign affairs. His 
opponent, Hillary Clinton, was committed to a hegemonistic 
vision and to specific policies based on the decades-old globalist-
liberal orthodoxy. As this paper points out, Trump’s “America 
First” approach in essence rejected the doctrine of America as a 
proposition nation, criticized its global engagement, questioned 
NATO’s utility and core mission, advocated rapprochement 
with Russia, and condemned the regime-change focus of earlier 
administrations. It further emphasizes that Trump explicitly 
sought to reaffirm the raison d’état as the guiding principle of 
foreign policymaking. His biggest problem all along was that the 
American “deep state” – key components of the national 
security apparat, the military-industrial complex, and the 
bipartisan political duopoly in Washington – rejected any 
realist criteria in their definition of “interests” and “threats.” 
They were intent on the maintenance of American global 
primacy, and they proved effective in imposing agenda contrary 
to Trump’s stated positions on all key global issues. At the same 
time, as this paper documents, Trump himself has been stepping 
ever farther away from his campaign pledges. It would be 
incorrect to say that the permanent state has successfully 
subverted and undermined the chief executive. It would be more 
accurate, we conclude, to recognize that a mutinous president 
has tried, and failed, to alter the long-charted global course of 
the permanent state. 

Ϯϵ

© 2017 Објавио часопис Политеиа (politeia.fpn.unibl.org). Ово је чланак отвореног приступа и дистрибуира се у складу са  "Creative Commons" лиценцом 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/rs) 

7ULINRYLü67UX

PS¶VIRUHLJQ

SROLF$YLFWRUIR

UWKH'HHS

6WD

WHSS

     Over the years, American “realists” – who 
accept that the world is imperfect, that 
violence is immanent to man, and that human 
nature is immutable – have often lamented the 
absence of grand-strategic thinking within the 
U.S. foreign-policy establishment.

1

 For the past 

quarter-century at least, successive admi-
nistrations have displayed a chronic inability 
to deploy America’s political, military, 
economic, and moral resources in a balanced 
and proportionate manner, in order to protect 
and enhance the country’s rationally defined 
security and economic interests.

2

 Washi-

ngton’s bipartisan, ideologically-driven obse-
ssion with global primacy (aka “full-spectrum-
dominance”) has resulted in a series of 
diplomatic, military and moral failures, costly 
in blood and treasure, and detrimental to the 
American interest.

3

  

     In November 2016 it appeared that Donald 
Trump, an outsider victorious against all odds 
and predictions, had a historic opportunity to 
make a fresh start. The moment was somewhat 
comparable to Ronald Reagan’s first victory in 
1980. Reagan used grandiloquent phrases at 
times (notably the

 

“Evil Empire”), but in 

practice he acted as an instinctive foreign poli-
cy realist. Likewise, Trump’s “America First” 
was a call for the return to realism based on 
the awareness that the United States needs to 
rediscover the value of 

transactional diplomacy

 

aimed at promoting America’s security, 

1

 See e.g. Јohn Ј. Mearsheimer,  

The Tragedy of 

Great Power Politics. 

New York: Norton, 2001. 

2

 Cf. Srdja Trifkovic, “Geopolitics Redeemed: 

Enhancing the Realist Discourse.” 

Defence Review: 

The Central Journal of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces

. Vol. 144 (2016/I). 

3

 Cf. F. William Engdahl, 

Full Spectrum Dominance: 

Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order

Edition Engdahl, 2009. 

prosperity, and cohesion in a Hobbesian 
world.  
     Some  resistance  from  the  upholders  of 
hegemonistic orthodoxy was to be expected, as 
witnessed even before Trump’s inauguration 
by the outgoing administration’s frantic 
attempts to poison the well on every front 
possible. Giving up the imagined capacity to 
dominate the world, and recognizing that it 
cannot be shaped in line with the elite class 
“values,” was never acceptable to the contro-
llers of the mainstream media discourse and to 
the government-subsidized think-tank nome-
nklatura. More seriously, some key compone-
nts of the intelligence, national-security and 
military-industrial complex proved effective in 
resisting Trump’s attempt to introduce 
transactional criteria in defining “interests” 
and “threats.”  

      
      The  2016  Presidential  Election:  Strategic 
Crossroads – 

The aftermath of the Cold War 

has seen the emergence of what Robert Kagan 
and William Kristol have called “benevolent 
global hegemony” of the United States.

4

 

Throughout this period, the leaders of both 
major parties have asserted that America’s 
unchallengeable military might was essential 
to the maintenance of global order. This period 
of “primacy” was marked by military 
interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Libya, and less overtly in Syria. The 
exercise of hegemony was validated by the 
rhetoric of “promoting democracy,” “protect-
ing human rights,” “confronting aggression,” 
and by the invocation of American excep-
tionalism: in world affairs the United States 
was supposedly motivated by values, rather 
than interests. 

4

 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Towards a 

Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.” 

Foreign Affairs

, 75 

(4), July-August 1996. 

background image

ϯϭ

© 2017 Објавио часопис Политеиа (politeia.fpn.unibl.org). Ово је чланак отвореног приступа и дистрибуира се у складу са  "Creative Commons" лиценцом 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/rs) 

7ULINRYLü67UX

PS¶VIRUHLJQ

SROLF$YLFWRUIR

UWKH'HHS

6WD

WHSS

dogma of American exceptionalism.

8

 She 

provided the blueprint for never-ending wars 
and crises wholly unrelated to any rational 
understanding of the country’s national 
interest.  
      “The  United  States  is  an  exceptional 
nation,” she told the Legion, and is still the 
last, best hope of Earth; “And part of what 
makes America an exceptional nation, is that 
we are also an indispensable nation. In fact, we 
are 

the

 indispensable nation. People all over 

the world look to us and follow our lead.” She 
aserted that “we recognize America’s unique 
and unparalleled ability to be a force for peace 
and progress, a champion for freedom and 
opportunity” and that U.S. power comes with a 
responsibility to lead, “with a fierce commi-
tment to our values… [W]hen America fails to 
lead, we leave a vacuum that either causes 
chaos or other countries or networks rush in to 
fill the void.” 
     Clinton’s 

triumphalist 

global 

vision 

reflected the post-Cold War consensus, to 
which both ends of the Beltway Duopoly – 
neoconservatives and neoliberals – subscribed 
with equal zeal. Its key tenet was that 
America’s unchallengeable military might is 
essential to the maintenance of a global order 
in which the U.S. government treats every spot 
on the globe as an area of vital American 
interest, resists any change of regional power 
balances, and promotes regime changes. The 
resulting military interventions would 
continue to be validated by the rhetoric of 
“peace and progress,” “freedom and 
opportunity,” “justice and human dignity,” 

8

 “Read Hillary Clinton’s Speech Touting ‘American 

Exceptionalism,’” 

Time

, August 31, 2016. 

<http://time.com/4474619/read-hillary-clinton-
american-legion-speech>  (retrieved September 1, 
2017). 

and by the invocation of self-awarded 
exceptionalism and indispensability.  
     Bipartisan  consensus  which  Mrs.  Clinton 
embodied (and which prompted many establi-
shment Republicans to support her) has been 
long codified in official strategic doctrine. 
Clinton’s strategic vision was clear: an abiding 
commitment to ideological fixations unrelated 
to any pragmatic notion of U.S. interests. The 
continuity of duopolistic key assumptions, and 
the escalation of risks and tensions resulting 
from their application, was clearly predictable. 

 
     Donald’s  Vision

 – Trump’s strategic 

concepts seemed less ideologically coherent 
than Clinton’s, but he was more rational in 
espousing his stated guiding principles and 
more “realist” in policy detail. In the early days 
of his candidacy he repeatedly asked why must 
the United States be engaged everywhere in the 
world and play the global policeman. He raised 
the issue of NATO’s utility and core mission, a 
quarter-century after the demise of the USSR 
which it was created to contain. In the course 
of the campaign he suggested readjustment or 
creation of a new coalition in order to put 
America’s resources to better use, especially in 
the fight against terrorism. 

He repeatedly 

advocated rapprochement with Russia. He 
criticized the regime-change mania of earlier 
administrations, pointing out the “disastrous” 
consequences of toppling Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq. He said that he would leave Syria’s 
Bashar al-Assad well alone and focus on 
degrading the Islamic State. 
     Trump’s  2016  global  vision  was  somewhat 
fragmentary, but voters knew that many of his 
positions ran counter to the duopolistic 
consensus. They 

did not know

 if he would be 

consistent, as President, in devising a new 
grand strategy and related specific policies. 
Such uncertainty was perhaps inevitable in 
view of Trump’s temperament, but the 

ϯϮ

© 2017 Published by Politeia (politeia.fpn.unibl.org). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/rs) 

32/,7(,$

ā

ā9RO

ā1R

ɉɈɅɂɌȿɂȺāāȽɨɞ

āȻɪ

possibility

 of a paradigmatic shift towards a 

national-interest-based approach apparently 
did exist. It was conceivable that he would 
effect a strategic pause in order to take stock of 
the global map, reconsider priorities, and 
devise policies on the basis of their likely costs 
and benefits. 
     On April 27, 2016, Donald Trump gave a 
long speech on foreign policy.

9

 It was his first 

attempt to present his views on world affairs in 
detail. It contained no standard duopoly 
references to promoting freedom, democracy 
and human rights around the world; 
confronting tyranny and evil; or making the 
world a better place in the image of the 
exceptional nation. Trump’s team of advisors 
prepared a coherent case for “offensive 
realism” instead: Nation-states are the princi-
pal actors in the international system; they 
pursue self-interest in what is still a Hobbesian 
world; America is not and should not be an 
exception to that old principle.

10

 This was 

anathema to the elite. The tone of media 
reaction was set by the

 New York Times

Trump’s “strange worldview… did not exhibit 

9

 “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy 

Speech.” 

The New York Times

, April 27, 2016. 

<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/
transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html?mcubz=0> 
(retrieved September 1, 2017). 

10

 Men are driven by “a perpetual and restless desire 

of power” for as long as they live. (

Leviathan

 XI-2) 

Hobbes’ grim dictum that states “enlarge their 
dominions upon all pretences of danger and fear of 
invasion or assistance that may be given to 
invaders” (XIX-4) accurately reflects the 

spiral 

model

  (“security  dilemma”)  of  international 

relations throughout recorded history. 

much grasp of the complexity of the world.”

11

 

But to those who did not subscribe to the 
Beltway 

Weltanschauung,

 Trump gave a 

summary of what had gone wrong with 
America’s role in the world, and a viable new 
approach. 
     “My  foreign  policy  will  always  put  the 
interests of the American people and 
American security above all else,” Trump 
declared at the outset of his address. “America 
First will be the major and overriding theme of 
my administration.” This was a commonsense 
summary which could have been objectionable 
only to the proponents of the doctrine of 
America as a proposition nation, which has 
created endless problems for both America 
and the rest of the world at least since 
Woodrow Wilson’s time.  
     Trump  correctly  noted  that  after  the  Cold 
War the U.S. foreign policy “veered badly off 
course,” and he named Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and 
Syria as examples of flawed interventions that 
had spread chaos in the region and helped the 
rise of ISIS. His diagnosis – that the U.S. 
foreign policy “is a complete and total disaster” 
devoid of vision, purpose, direction, and 
strategy – was reasonable; so was his warning 
that America’s resources were overextended. 
Trump promised to look for new advisors in 
the field of foreign policy, and to shun the 
establishment responsible “for a long history 
of failed policies and continued losses at 
war.”

12

 

11

 “Donald Trump’s Strange Worldview,” by the 

Editorial Board. 

The New York Times

, April 28, 

2016.<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/opini
on/donald-trump-to-world-im-willing-to-
walk.html?mcubz=0> (retrieved September 1, 
2017). 

12

 In addition, Trump lamented America’s failure to 

protect Middle Eastern Christians, who he said 
were “subject to intense persecution and even 
genocide.” He noted that “we’re in a war against 

background image

ϯϰ

© 2017 Published by Politeia (politeia.fpn.unibl.org). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/rs) 

32/,7(,$

ā

ā9RO

ā1R

ɉɈɅɂɌȿɂȺāāȽɨɞ

āȻɪ

Trump to “reconsider” using the phrase.

16

 

According to ADL CEO Jonathan Greenblatt, 
the America First movement was characterized 
by “the undercurrents of anti-semitism and 
bigotry.” The claim was incongruous. 
Explicitly putting their nation first is the 

sine 

qua non

 of political leaders everywhere outside 

America. The real objective of the campaign 
was to suggest that having the audacity to put 
one’s own country’s interests first, ahead of the 
globalist one-world agenda, was reactionary 
and indicative of toxic, bigoted, intolerant 
“U.S. nationalism.” 
     The corporate media machine in the United 
States is controlled by members of an elite 
class which promotes cultural Marxism 
manifested in a corrupt mass culture, 
multiculturalist indoctrination, and mass 
immigration; and which opposes any sense of 
historical and cultural identity. From the very 
moment he entered the presidential race, 
Trump encountered intense media hostility. 
His media detractors have been almost 
invariably globalists who believe that people 
should not feel a special bond for any 
particular country or nation, but should 
transfer their loyalties to an imaginary global 
community.  

16

 “ADL Urges Donald Trump to Reconsider 

‘America First’ in Foreign Policy Approach,” April 
26, 2016. <https://www.adl.org/news/press-
releases/adl-urges-donald-trump-to-reconsider-
america-first-in-foreign-policy-approach> 
(retrieved September 1, 2017). The “America first” 
artificial controversy was an early example of the 
establishment’s reductive propaganda against 
Trump, based on the logical fallacy of false 
equivalence. Along those same lines, since the 

Deutschlandlied

 – proudly proclaiming that 

Germany stands “above all else” – is Germany’s 
national anthem today, just as it was during the 
Nazi era (1933-1945), Angela Merkel’s Federal 
Republic equals the Third Reich. 

     Since  the  final  decade  of  the  twentieth 
century, such notions have been internalized 
by the American elite class and by the 
establishment of both major parties. Back in 
2001, then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott felt ready to declare that the United 
States may not exist “in its current form” in 
the 21st century, because the very concept of 
nationhood – in America and throughout the 
world – will have been rendered obsolete.

17

 

“All countries are basically social arrange-
ments, accommodations to changing circu-
mstances,” he wrote. “No matter how perma-
nent and even sacred they may seem at any 
one time, in fact they are all artificial and 
temporary.” Those who objected to “America 
First” agreed: since nations are transient, 
virtual-reality entities, owing emotional 
allegiance to any one of them is irrational; 
promoting its interests in preference to those 
of others is suspect, or outright “fascist.” 

 
     Transnational  Trumpophobia  – 

One 

month after Trump’s foreign policy speech, at 
a press conference at the G-7 summit in Japan 
(May 26, 2016), President Barack Obama 
declared that world leaders were “rattled” by 
Trump, “because a lot of the proposals that 
he’s made display either ignorance of world 
affairs or a cavalier attitude or an interest in 
getting tweets and headlines instead of actually 

17

 Strobe Talbott, “America Abroad.” 

Time

, June 24, 

2001. 
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,
9171,160112,00.html> (retrieved September 1, 
2017). 

Želiš da pročitaš svih 25 strana?

Prijavi se i preuzmi ceo dokument.

Ovaj materijal je namenjen za učenje i pripremu, ne za predaju.

Slični dokumenti